Florida v. White, ___ U.S. ___ (No. 98-223, filed 5/17/99). The United States Supreme Court held that when officers have probable cause to believe that a vehicle is forfeitable contraband, they do not have to obtain a warrant to seize and search the car. Florida police observed Tyvessel Tyvorus White delivering cocaine in his car in July and August 1993. Several months later, they arrested White on unrelated charges while he was at work. They towed his car and, during an inventory search, found two rocks of crack cocaine in the ashtray. White moved to suppress the evidence, claiming a warrant was required to tow the vehicle. The Court rejected White’s argument, analogizing to the inherent mobility doctrine first announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). The Court said the need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away is "equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband the police seek to secure." ___ U.S. at ___. The Court also noted the car was seized from a public area -- White’s employer’s parking lot, and did not involve any invasion of White’s privacy.

    Wilson v. Layne, ___ U.S. ___ (No. 98-83, filed 5/24/99). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held that allowing a newspaper reporter and photographer to accompany federal marshals and county police officers into a home to serve a felony fugitive warrant violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The photographer took several pictures of the resident, who was dressed in his underwear and was taken down by officers in his living room. Other than being present, the reporter and photographer took no part in the execution of the warrant. The Washington Post did not publish any photographs. Nevertheless, the Court held that the privacy of a person’s home dictated that police refrain from inviting reporters or other third parties into a home during execution of a warrant. The Court stated there could be some occasions when a third party can be present, for example, to identify stolen property under a warrant allowing a search for stolen property, but rejected all of the government’s asserted legitimate reasons for the reporter’s presence. Although the Court held the defendant’s violated the Fourth Amendment, they found this particular Fourth Amendment right was not clearly established in 1992 when the warrant execution occurred, so the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and the plaintiffs could not recover money damages.

    State v. Toothman, ___ Kan. ___ (No. 81,293 filed 5/28/99). In this case the Kansas Supreme Court tweaks the definition of "reasonable suspicion" somewhat. An officer was dispatched to a cars stuck in ditch call, but didn’t find anything. Later, a citizen reported helping push a blue Ford Festiva out the ditch, and the young white male driver was "extremely nervous." The citizen said the ignition in the vehicle was punched and loose wires were hanging from the steering column. Later, after unsuccessful attempts to contact the owner of the vehicle and issuance of an attempt to locate, officers made a felony car stop and arrested the driver (who matched the citizen’s description) for, among other things, expired tags and no driver’s license. The arrested person was sweaty, had dry lips, was fidgety and had large, nonreactive pupils. Officers searched the car and his person and found drugs and paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress, alleging that he wasn’t violating any traffic laws, therefore there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The court, two justices dissenting, rejected this argument, holding the officer had a valid reason to see if the vehicle was stolen and the owner safe, and to search the defendant as part of the Terry stop and incident to the defendant’s arrest. The court held the facts known and articulated by the arresting officer went beyond just an unparticularized suspicion or a mere hunch of criminal activity.

    State v. Seabury, ___ Kan. ___ (No. 81,634 filed May 28, 1999). In this case the Kansas Supreme Court reiterates the rule from State v. Hudson, 261 Kan. 535, 931 P.2d 679 (1997) that the severity of an obstruction charge depends on the arresting officer’s authority, knowledge and intent. If intending to arrest only for a misdemeanor, the obstruction is a misdemeanor. If intending to arrest for a felony, the obstruction is a felony. Here, officers were serving a search warrant at defendant’s house when the defendant showed up and began creating a scene. Although officers expected to find evidence of cocaine trafficking (a felony) in the house, they only found misdemeanor amounts of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On these facts, the defendant could only be charged with misdemeanor obstruction rather than felony obstruction.

    State v. Cardenas, ___ Kan.App.2d ___ (No. 80,012 filed 5/7/99). The Kansas Court of Appeals held that when an officer fails to complete the portion of a form search warrant specifying with particularity the items to be seized, the warrant, even though signed by a magistrate, is fatally defective and any evidence seized pursuant to the warrant is inadmissible. The good faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), will not save such a warrant.

    Thomas v. Kansas Department of Revenue, ___ Kan.App.2d ___ (No. 79,831 filed 5/7/99). In this case, the officer certifying a breath test refusal checked only "person stated alcohol/drugs consumed" as reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendant claimed that statutes required the DC-27 to state "with particularity" sufficient allegations of fact to support reasonable grounds. The court of appeals rejected this argument and held conclusory allegations in a DC-27 are sufficient to support a driver’s license suspension.

    Please advise if you have any questions about these cases.