In Wyoming v. Houghton, ___ U.S. ___ (No. 98-184, filed April 5, 1999), the United States Supreme Court made it clear that if you have probable cause to search a vehicle for drugs, you can look anywhere in that vehicle where drugs might be concealed, including a passenger’s purse. After stopping a car, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer saw a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket. The driver told the officer he used it to take drugs. The officer then searched the passenger compartment, including a passenger’s purse that was on the back seat. The officer found drug paraphernalia there and arrested the passenger. She objected to the search. The Wyoming Supreme Court held the search was unconstitutional, adopting a "passenger’s property" rule stating if the officer knows or should know that a container is the personal effect of a passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search unless someone had the opportunity to conceal the contraband within the personal effect to avoid detection.. The United States Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the passenger’s property rule as unworkable. It held that passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property they transport in cars and the governmental interest in effective law enforcement require the ability to search the passenger’s belongings because an automobile’s ready mobility creates the risk that evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant is obtained.

     In Valdez v. McPheters, ___ F.3d ___ (No. 97-4057, 10^th Cir. filed April 5, 1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the 10^th Circuit clarified the rules on when officers can enter a home when they have an arrest warrant for someone they believe is inside. As you may recall from your training, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, allows entry into the residence of the person named in the warrant to make the arrest, while Stegald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, requires officers to obtain a search warrant when the entry is into a residence owned or occupied by someone other than the person named in the warrant. Valdez sets forth the test that will govern when officers are not exactly sure if the person named in the warrant lives in the residence they enter.

     Federal officers went to Rosanna Valdez’s residence in LaPoint Utah looking for her son, Raymond. Officers had a warrant for Raymond’s arrest. The warrant listed his address as "transient," but a document accompanying the warrant stated Raymond commits burglaries in Salt Lake City then goes back to the Indian Reservation at LaPoint on weekends. Officers knew Raymond was unemployed, and liked to stay out late at night drinking and doing drugs. Officers also received information from other officers and citizens stating Raymond lived with his mother. Other factors the court examined included (1) Raymond gave his mother’s address as his own when booked on a drug charge about 3 months prior to the search, (2) a pickup truck of one of Raymond’s known associates was seen at Valdez’s residence on several occasions; and (3) three days prior to the search, one of the officers investigated an accident involving the pickup and, although the vehicle was abandoned, the evidence indicated two people were in the vehicle at the time of the accident and footprints led from the vehicle in the direction of the Valdez residence. The officers went to the Valdez home at around noon. There were conflicting stories about whether Rosanna Valdez gave consent to enter, but the officers entered and searched for, but did not find, Raymond. The officers left, but returned after a citizen advised they saw Raymond at Rosanna’s house earlier in the day. The officers again entered and searched, but did not find Raymond. Raymond later turned himself in. Rosanna sued the officers for violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.

    The Tenth Circuit held the officers had a reasonable basis for believing Raymond lived at Rosanna’s house and that officer had a reasonable basis for believing Raymond would be in the residence at the time they entered, therefore the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court rejected a standard which would require officers to have probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant lived at the residence. The court further stated that direct surveillance or actual viewing of the suspect on the premises is not required, and officers can take into account the fact that criminals may be attempting to conceal their whereabouts.

     Please contact me if you have any questions about these decisions.