K.S.A. Chapter 21 Article 32
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Current through End of 2007 Legislative Session
21-3201 Criminal intent.
21-3202 Criminal intent; exclusions.
21-3203 Ignorance or mistake.
21-3204 Guilt without criminal intent, when.
21-3205 Liability for crimes of another.
21-3206 Corporations; criminal responsibility.
21-3207 Individual liability for corporate crime.
21-3208 Intoxication.
21-3209 Compulsion.
21-3210 Entrapment.
21-3211 Use of force in defense of a person.
21-3212 Use of force in defense of dwelling.
21-3213 Use of force in defense of property other than a dwelling.
21-3214 Use of force by an aggressor.
21-3215 Law enforcement officer's use of force in making arrest.
21-3216 Private person's use of force in making arrest.
21-3217 Use of force in resisting arrest.
21-3218 No Duty to Retreat; exceptions.
21-3219 Use of force; immunity from prosecution or liability; investigation.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by this code. Criminal intent may be established by proof that the conduct of the accused person was intentional or reckless. Proof of intentional conduct shall be required to establish criminal intent, unless the statute defining the crime expressly provides that the prohibited act is criminal if done in a reckless manner.
(b) Intentional conduct is conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental. As used in this code, the terms "knowing," "willful," "purposeful," and "on purpose" are included within the term "intentional."
(c) Reckless conduct is conduct done under circumstances that show a realization of the imminence of danger to the person of another and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger. The terms "gross negligence," "culpable negligence," "wanton negligence" and "wantonness" are included within the term 'recklessness' as used in this code.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3201; L. 1992, ch. 298, § 2; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 17; July 1.
21-3202. Criminal intent; exclusions.
(1) Proof of criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the statute under which the accused is prosecuted, or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that statute.
(2) Proof of criminal intent does not require proof that the accused had knowledge of the age of a minor, even though age is a material element of the crime with which he is charged.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3202; July 1, 1970.
21-3203. Ignorance or mistake.
(1) A person's ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law, except as provided in section 21-3202, is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the crime.
(2) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute a crime is a defense if:
(a) The crime is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published in the Kansas administrative regulations or an annual supplement thereto, as provided by law; and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or
(b) He acts in reliance upon a statute which later is determined to be invalid; or
(c) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of the supreme court of Kansas or a United States appellate court later overruled or reversed;
(d) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the crime made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute.
(3) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact or law, or reasonable belief, as described in subsection (2) of this section, is a defense to the crime charged, he may be convicted of an included crime of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed it to be.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3203; July 1, 1970.
21-3204. Guilt without criminal intent, when.
A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is: (1) A misdemeanor, cigarette or tobacco infraction or traffic infraction and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described; or (2) a violation of K.S.A. 8-1567 or 8-1567a and amendments thereto.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3204; L. 1984, ch. 39, § 33; L. 1996, ch. 214, § 25; L. 1999, ch. 164, § 4; July 1.
21-3205. Liability for crimes of another.
(1) A person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such person intentionally aids, abets, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit the crime.
(2) A person liable under subsection (1) hereof is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by such person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.
(3) A person liable under this section may be charged with and convicted of the crime although the person alleged to have directly committed the act constituting the crime lacked criminal or legal capacity or has not been convicted or has been acquitted or has been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime based on the same act.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3205; L. 1990, ch. 100, § 1; July 1.
21-3206. Corporations; criminal responsibility.
(1) A corporation is criminally responsible for acts committed by its agents when acting within the scope of their authority.
(2) "Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3206; July 1, 1970.
21-3207. Individual liability for corporate crime.
(1) An individual who performs criminal acts, or causes such acts to be performed, in the name of or on behalf of a corporation is legally responsible to the same extent as if such acts were in his own name or on his own behalf.
(2) An individual who has been convicted of a crime based on conduct performed by him for and on behalf of a corporation is subject to punishment as an individual upon conviction of such crime, although a lesser or different punishment is authorized for the corporation.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3207; July 1, 1970.
(1) The fact that a person charged with a crime was in an intoxicated condition at the time the alleged crime was committed is a defense only if such condition was involuntarily produced and rendered such person substantially incapable of knowing or understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct and of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) An act committed while in a state of voluntary intoxication is not less criminal by reason thereof, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element to constitute a particular crime, the fact of intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such intent or state of mind.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3208; July 1, 1970.
(1) A person is not guilty of a crime other than murder or voluntary manslaughter by reason of conduct which he performs under the compulsion or threat of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes that death or great bodily harm will be inflicted upon him or upon his spouse, parent, child, brother or sister if he does not perform such conduct.
(2) The defense provided by this section is not available to one who willfully or wantonly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to compulsion or threat.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3209; July 1, 1970.
A person is not guilty of a crime if his criminal conduct was induced or solicited by a public officer or his agent for the purposes of obtaining evidence to prosecute such person, unless:
(a) The public officer or his agent merely afforded an opportunity or facility for committing the crime in furtherance of a criminal purpose originated by such person or a co-conspirator; or
(b) The crime was of a type which is likely to occur and recur in the course of such person's business, and the public officer or his agent in doing the inducing or soliciting did not mislead such person into believing his conduct to be lawful.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3210; July 1, 1970.
21-3211. Use of force in defense of a person.
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.
(b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force under circumstances described in subsection (a) if such person reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person.
(c) Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person or a third person.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3211; L. 2006, ch. 194, § 3; July 1.
21-3212. Use of force in defense of dwelling.
(a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s unlawful entry into or attack upon such person’s dwelling or occupied vehicle.
(b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack upon any dwelling or occupied vehicle if such person reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or another.
(c) Nothing in this section shall require a person to retreat if such person is using force to protect such person’s dwelling or occupied vehicle.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3212; L. 2006, ch. 194, § 4; July 1.
21-3213. Use of force in defense of property other than a dwelling.
A person who is lawfully in possession of property other than a dwelling is justified in the threat or use of force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with such property. Only such degree of force or threat thereof as a reasonable man would deem necessary to prevent or terminate the interference may intentionally be used.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3213; July 1, 1970.
21-3214. Use of force by an aggressor.
The justification described in sections 21-3211, 21-3212, and 21-3213, is not available to a person who:
(1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony; or
(2) Initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, with intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
(3) Otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself or another, unless:
(a) He has reasonable ground to believe that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or
(b) In good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3214; July 1, 1970.
21-3215. Law enforcement officer's use of force in making arrest.
(1) A law enforcement officer, or any person whom such officer has summoned or directed to assist in making a lawful arrest, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. Such officer is justified in the use of any force which such officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which such officer reasonably believes to be necessary to defend the officer's self or another from bodily harm while making the arrest. However, such officer is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when such officer reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to such officer or another person, or when such officer reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape and such officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or attempted to commit a felony involving great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that such person will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.
(2) A law enforcement officer making an arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justified in the use of any force which such officer would be justified in using if the warrant were valid, unless such officer knows that the warrant is invalid.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3215; L. 1990, ch. 98, § 1; L. 1993, ch. 69, § 1; July 1.
21-3216. Private person's use of force in making arrest.
(1) A private person who makes, or assists another private person in making a lawful arrest is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if he were summoned or directed by a law enforcement officer to make such arrest, except that he is justified in the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another.
(2) A private person who is summoned or directed by a law enforcement officer to assist in making an arrest which is unlawful, is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if the arrest were lawful.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3216; July 1, 1970.
21-3217. Use of force in resisting arrest.
A person is not authorized to use force to resist an arrest which he knows is being made either by a law enforcement officer or by a private person summoned and directed by a law enforcement officer to make the arrest, even if the person arrested believes that the arrest is unlawful.
History: L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3217; July 1, 1970.
21-3218. No Duty to Retreat; exceptions.
(a) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in a place where such person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand such person’s ground and meet force with force.
(b) This section shall be part of and supplemental to the Kansas criminal code.
History: L. 2006, ch. 194, § 1; May 25.
21-3219. Use of force; immunity from prosecution or liability; investigation.
(a) A person who uses force which, subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3214, and amendments thereto, is justified pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3211, 21-3212 or 21-3213, and amendments thereto, is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom force was used is a law enforcement officer who was acting in the performance of such officer’s official duties and the officer identified the officer’s self in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used in this subsection, "criminal prosecution" includes arrest, detention in custody and charging or prosecution of the defendant.
(b) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (a), but the agency shall not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause for the arrest.
(c) A county or district attorney or other prosecutor may commence a criminal prosecution upon a determination of probable cause.
History: L. 2006, ch. 194, § 2; L. 2007, ch. 169, § 1; May 17.